Reference

Module 5 Assuring Quality in DNA Testing

¹State v. Van Adams, 984 P.2d 16 (Ariz. 1999); Smith v. State, 702 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. 1998); State v. Ramsey, 550 S.E.2d 294(S.C. 2001); J.H.H. v. State, 897 So. 2d 419 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)

Module 10 Collection of DNA Evidence from Suspects and Arrestees from Suspects and Arrestees

¹A grand jury subpoena has been allowed as a means of securing DNA evidence. In re Shaddie Clark Shabazz, 200 F. Supp. 2d 578 (D.S.C. 2002) (applying the “reasonable suspicion” standard to a Grand Jury subpoena seeking a DNA sample from a crime suspect).

²There is no Federal constitutional right implicated in seizing DNA evidence left in a public place. Several States have found searches of trash to be impermissible (if conducted without a warrant) under their respective State constitutions. Separately, some States apply a forced abandonment doctrine that precludes the seizure of items “abandoned” during an unlawful police chase. The United States Constitution does not bar use of such abandoned property. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).

³ Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (the taking of a blood sample does not implicate the Fifth Amendment)

⁴ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (being forced to appear in a lineup does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination)

⁵ Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel at an identification procedure applies only “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”).

⁶ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

⁷ Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969).

⁸ Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).

⁹ Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 n.2 (2003) (“We have, however, left open the possibility that, 'under circumscribed procedures,' a court might validly authorize a seizure on less than probable cause when the object is fingerprinting”).

¹⁰ United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 806 (1974) (“When it became apparent that the articles of clothing were evidence of the crime for which Edwards was being held, the police were entitled to take, examine, and preserve them for use as evidence, just as they are normally permitted to seize evidence of crime when it is lawfully encountered.”).

¹¹ Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) ("Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned.").

¹² United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).

¹³ Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).

¹⁴ Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (consent must be knowing and voluntary).

¹⁵ Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (consent that is the product of an illegal arrest is generally invalid).

¹⁶ Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).

¹⁷ Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

¹⁸ See United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 2003); Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2003); Shaffer v. Saffel, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998) (“while obtaining DNA samples implicates Fourth Amendment concerns, it is reasonable in light of an inmate’s diminished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion involved, and the legitimate government interest in using DNA to investigate and prosecute crimes”); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559-62 (9th Cir. 1995) Jones v. Murry, 962 F.2d 302, 306-308 (4th Cir. 1992) ); see also Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78-82 (2d Cir. 1999) (compelled DNA testing valid under “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement); but see United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2003)(compulsory provision of DNA by convicted offenders and unconstitutional search in the absence of particularized reasonable suspicion; court also rejects; United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).

¹⁹ Statutes: Alaska R. Crim. P. 16(c)(1)–(2) (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3905 (2006); Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1 (2006); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-625 (2006); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 810.1–810.2 (West 2006); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3301 – 29-3307 (2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-271 – 15A-282 (2006); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-8-1 – 77-8-4 (2006).

Decisions: In re Nontestimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., 762 A.2d 1239 (Vt. 2000); State v. Rodriguez, 921 P.2d 643, 650 (Ariz. 1996) (based on Arizona NTO statute); People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 32 (Colo. 1981)(based on Colorado NTO rule); Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205, 216 (D.C. 1971); Baker v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Ind. 1983); In re Fingerprinting of M.B., 309 A.2d 3, 7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155, 1160 (N.J. 1983); In re Order Requiring Fingerprinting of a Juvenile, 537 N.E.2d 1286, 1288–89 (Ohio 1989) (based on Ohio statute allowing court to authorize photographing or fingerprinting of a juvenile).

²⁰ Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App. 2000).

²¹ Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).

²²State v. Dabney, 663 N.W.2d 366 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2003).

Module 11 Pretrial DNA Evidence Issues

¹ Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).

² Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

³ Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56.

⁴ Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544 (2004).

⁵ The States that have ruled that an individual need not demonstrate bad faith on the part of the State include: Alabama, see Ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1992); Alaska, see Thorne v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326 (Alaska 1989); Connecticut, see State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1995); Delaware, see Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992); Hawaii, see State v. Okumura, 894 P.2d 80 (Haw. 1995); Idaho, see State v. Fain, 774 P.2d 252 (Idaho 1989); Massachusetts, see Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1991); Minnesota, see State v. Schmid, 487 N.W.2d 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992): New Hampshire, see State v. Smagula, 578 A.2d 1215 (N.H. 1990); New Mexico, see State v. Riggs, 838 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1992); Tennessee, see State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); Vermont, see State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 (Vt. 1994); and West Virginia, see State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504 (W.Va. 1995).

⁶ Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

⁷ Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 88.

⁸ See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E), requiring production for inspection, on request, of “tangible objects…within the government’s possession, custody or control…[where] item is material to preparing the defense…”

⁹ Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(F). Similarly, discovery rules may require disclosure of summaries of expert witness testimony. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(F).

¹⁰ United States v. Furguero, 55 M.J. 525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2001).

¹¹State v. Proctor, 559 S.E.2d 318 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).

¹² State v. Dunn, 571 S.E.2d 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).

¹³ Cole v. State, 835 A.2d 600 (Md. 2003).

¹⁴ Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

¹⁵ Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

¹⁶People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976).

¹⁷ Fed. R .Evid. 702.

¹⁸ General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

¹⁹ Rapp v. Singh, 152 F. Supp. 2d 694, 699 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

²⁰Mitochondrial methodology generally accepted under Frye and Daubert: People v. Klinger, 713 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2000); State v. Smith, 100 Wash. App. 1064, appeal denied, 16 P.3d 1267 (Wash. 2000); State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091 (Conn. 2001); State v. Hammons, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 545, 2002 WL 484645 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2002); Magaletti v. State, 847 So. 2d 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Scott, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 758, 1999 WL 547460 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 28, 1999), reversed in part on other grounds, 33 S.W.3d 746 (Tenn. 2000).

2.010a

DNA testing methodologies approved: Florida:Brim v. State, 779 So. 2d 427, 430 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (collecting cases approving DNA testing as satisfying the Frye or Daubert standards). See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 413, 457–458 (April 2001) (endnotes omitted) (“The opinions are practically unanimous in holding that the more commonly used PCR-based procedures satisfy these standards.”)

Statistical methodology generally accepted. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 413 (April 2001); California:People v. Soto, 981 P.2d 958, 974 (Cal. 1999) ("[T]he controversy over population substructuring and use of the unmodified product rule has
dissipated."); Florida:Brim v. State, 779 So.2d 427, 430 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (collecting cases approving such probability testimony); Illinois: People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731-32 (Ill. 1996) ("While there has been some controversy over the use of the product rule in calculating the frequency of a DNA match, that controversy appears to be dissipating."); Maryland: Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 238 (Md. 1996) ("The debate over the product rule essentially ended in 1993."); Massachusetts:Commonwealth v. Fowler, 685 N.E.2d 746, 748–750 (Mass. 1997) (product rule now meets test of scientific reliability in light of 1996 NRC Report).

²¹ Murray v. State, 838 So.2d 1073, 1077 (Fla. 2002).

²² People v. Pizarro, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 21, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (although RFLP analysis has met the Frye test, a specific RFLP procedure using “band intensity” analysis had not been shown to satisfy Frye and thus its results were inadmissible).

²³ Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).

²⁴ 470 U.S. at 79.

²⁵ For a detailed survey of this issue, see John Devlin, Comment, Genetics and Justice: an Indigent Defendant's Right to DNA Expert Assistance, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 395.

²⁶Dubose v. State, 662 So.2d 1189, 1197 (Ala. 1995). See also Cade v. State, 658 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (requiring the provision of expert DNA assistance where DNA is central to the case and the evidence of guilt is otherwise not overwhelming); State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746 (Tenn. 2000) (finding DNA expert assistance part of the “basic tools of an adequate defense”); Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 585 S.E.2d 327, 332-333 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), (where initial funding of expert generated report that prosecution expert had made errors, lower court erred in denying funds for defense expert to testify at trial).

²⁷ People v. Tanner, 671 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. 2003) (no error in denying defense DNA expert where prosecution DNA evidence showed that defendant was not the source of crime scene DNA and counsel made no showing as to how an expert would otherwise assist the defense); Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 SE.2d 920, 926 (Va. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154 (1997) (denial upheld where defendant failed to make particularized showing of the need for expert assistance); Mosier v. State, 462 S.E.2d 643, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (“Mosier failed to show what his expert proposed to do regarding the evidence and failed to advise the court of the anticipated cost of these services.”).

²⁸ Leonard v. Michigan, 287 F. Supp. 2d 765, 790–792 (W.D. Mich. 2003).

Module 13 Trial Presentation

¹ Jason Schklar & Shari S. Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, in 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 159 (1999).

² See Murray v. State, 838 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2002) (DNA testing procedures were sufficiently flawed to be inadmissible under Frye).

Module 14 Postconviction DNA Cases

¹ Testing under category 3 circumstances would encompass circumstances not encompassed by 18 U.S.C. § 3600, which states “DNA testing of the specific evidence that may produce new material evidence that would (A) support a theory of [an affirmative] defense [presented at trial] and (B) raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did not commit the offense."

Module 15 Emerging Trends

¹ Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Fed. R. Evid. 702.

² State v. Bogan, 905 P.2d 515, 518 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).